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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIBERAL 
AWAKENING IN GREECE, 1958-1967
Stan Draenos
ABSTRACT: This paper traces the evolution and outcome of the US opening to the Greek
Center triggered by the May 1958 parliamentary elections. It focuses on the role which that
opening played in the liberal awakening that took shape under the banner of the Center
Union (CU) party, founded in September 1961. After John F. Kennedy assumed the US
presidency (January 1961), New Frontier liberals, including Andreas Papandreou, son of CU
leader George Papandreou, pushed more aggressively for this opening, which was validated
by the Center Union’s rise to power in November 1963, the same month as the Kennedy
assassination. During the Johnson Administration, US liberal policies in Greece were tested
and found wanting, as Cold War fears trumped the US embrace of reform and change in
Greece. The American retreat drove US policies towards bankruptcy, culminating in an
uneasy acceptance of the 1967 Greek military dictatorship, wreaking permanent damage on
Greek–US relations.
The US enunciation of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947 was a defining
moment for the two countries most directly involved: the United States and
Greece. For the US, intervention to defeat the Greek Left in the Civil War
(1946-1949) marked the advent of its Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union.
For Greece, it marked the beginning of a deep and complicated dependency
relationship with the global super power that had replaced Great Britain as the
protector of Western interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.1
As President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency entered its final years at
the end of the 1950s, Cold War tensions were on the rise, stoked by the nuclear
arms race, the cementing of the East–West divide in Europe, and American
fears of Communist takeover in the post-war struggles for national
independence among former European colonies, as well as Latin American
revolutionary movements. Soviet technological advances, symbolised by the
launching of Sputnik in 1957, fed American anxieties that the country was
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“falling behind”. Within an atmosphere of growing American insecurity,
Greece emerged once more as the scene of unsettling political developments. 
On May 11, 1958 Greeks went to the polls to elect a new parliament. The
results showed a startling resurgence of popular support for the Communist
Left. Despite the American-backed defeat of Communist-led forces in the
1946-1949 Civil War and restrictions on civil liberties in order to contain the
“internal Communist enemy”, the Communist-front EDA (United Democratic
Left) party won nearly a quarter of the votes to become the official
parliamentary opposition. To be sure, Konstantine Karamanlis’ right-wing ERE
(National Radical Union) received 41% of the popular vote, enough to give it
a comfortable 56% majority of seats in parliament. But the KF (Liberal Party),
co-chaired by George Papandreou and Sophocles Venizelos, trailed in third
place, further demoralising Greece’s splintered Centrist forces. 
The resurgence of the Communist Left was a seismic event in Greek politics,
whose shockwaves were felt in the United States. The Communist resurgence
threatened to undo Greece’s emergence under the Truman Doctrine as a
functioning, pro-Western parliamentary democracy, and frontline ally in the
Cold War with the Soviet Union. Resurgent Communism in Greece raised
urgent questions for US policymakers, occasioning a review of Greek affairs. A
milestone in that review was a lengthy report prepared by the political section
of the US Embassy in Athens called “The Greek Political Scene: Prospects for
the Future”, which the Embassy dispatched to Washington on September 22,
1958.2 The report was a response to a request for input from the Embassy as a
National Security Council working group on Greece prepared to develop a
revised Operations Plan for Greece.3 No routine filing, the Embassy’s report
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2 The 17-page report was classified secret and co-authored by J. E. Horner, S. G. Gebelt,
W. Dizard and M. Stearns of the Embassy political section. “The Greek Political Scene:
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marked a revived American interest in strengthening Greece’s splintered Centrist
forces, laying the basis for a US opening to the Center that would have a decisive
impact on Greece’s domestic politics during the Kennedy Administration.4
The Embassy’s prescient analysis focuses on those aspects that helped shape
what the report called a “plan of action to deal with the problem of attempting
to reduce communist strength, and thereby to keep Greece a firm source of
strength within the NATO alliance”. To this end, the report identifies five
trends, “none of which can provide much comfort to American policymakers”,
that had emerged following the Greek Left’s disturbing electoral gains: 
1. The “growing discussion of the desirability or inevitability of some form
of dictat orship”.
2. The search “to find some formula” for creating a “multi-party nationalist
government” to displace Karamanlis.
3. The “strivings for the establishment of a ‘new’ center party, or center
coalition which would provide a nationalist haven for those opposed
both to ERE and EDA”. 
4. The Greek government’s “belated effort…to take measures to curb the
growing power of the neo-communists, perhaps to the point of
straining the fabric of democratic legality”. [my italics]
5. The “growing awareness…that the phenomenal American-promoted
economic growth of the post-war period may be replaced by serious
economic problems” – problems reflecting “endemic” weaknesses of
Greece’s economy. 
These trends, taken together, had important implications for US policy
objectives in Greece – objectives that originated in the Truman Doctrine and
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implementing NSC policies. Within the Eisenhower Administration, the strongest advocate
for the policy of support for the Non-Communist Left was Allen Dulles, brother to the
hawkish Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Allen Dulles, also a close friend of Greece’s
Queen Frederika, was director of the CIA and member of the OCB. The OCB was abolished
under Kennedy Administration reforms of the national security apparatus and replaced by a
more flexible arrangement, relying on ad hoc groups to carry out policies. Cf. “History of
the National Security Council, 1947-1997”, published by the Office of the Historian, US
Department of State, 1997, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html.
4 Cf. Yiannis Stefanidis, ∞ﬁ ÙÔÓ ∂ÌÊ‡ÏÈÔ ÛÙÔÓ æ˘¯Úﬁ ¶ﬁÏÂÌÔ. ∏ ∂ÏÏ¿‰· Î·È Ô ™˘Ì-
Ì·¯ÈÎﬁ˜ ·Ú¿ÁÔÓÙ·˜ (1949-52) [From the Civil War to the Cold War: Greece and the Allied
factor (1949-52)], Athens: Proskinio, 1999, p. 123. Stefanidis notes that the US’ support for
Greece’s liberal forces effectively ended when the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 led to
a “shift in the priorities of US foreign and security policies”.
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its aftermath. The report succinctly summarises these continuing objectives
as the:
[...] maintenance of a democratic, economically-viable nation aligned
with the United States, NATO, and other free nations of the world.
Expressed negatively, our major objective is to ensure that Greece does
not, through outside aggression, internal subversion, or by electoral
processes [my italics], associate herself with or become a dependency
[sic] on the Soviet Union. We also assume that Greek tendencies
towards authoritarianism, even if Western-oriented [my italics], would
[also] be inimical to our overall objectives.
According to the report, the resurgence of the Left indicated that “the
period of post-war progress, which found successive, and generally
conservative, governments moving ahead in a democratic, Free World direction
has begun to lose momentum, if indeed it has not already done so”. Turning to
the policy implications of this situation, the report calls for a new approach.
The uncertainties of the current scene, it warns, could lead to “a fatal
weakening of the Karamanlis Government”. And while there exists “no real
short-term alternative to continued United States support of ERE…the United
States must be prepared to act quickly should that Government fall”. The
report then articulates a new departure: “This means, among other things, that
we must keep lines open to other nationalist individuals and groupings, bearing
in mind that any successor to the present Government might well be less
overtly pro-Western [my italics] in outlook and pronouncement.” Hence, the
report recommends combining continued support of Karamanlis and ERE
with the “cultivation on a cautious and selective basis of certain nationalist
elements and individuals not now in the Government which, upon analysis, we
might consider [to] have the capability of developing into or contributing to a
non-communist alternative to ERE [my italics]”. 
The “cautious and selective” approach the report recommends reflects the
authors’ scepticism regarding the ongoing attempts of Greece’s fractious
liberals, whom the US had supported during the Civil War, to create such an
alternative. The report points to “recent endeavors by aging ex-Prime Minister
Papandreou to set up a ‘new’ center political party” which “it is argued, would
provide a nationalist alternative to ERE, and would thus avoid the dangers of
polarization”. But it then characterises Papandreou’s effort as another example
of the “facile tendency” of Karamanlis’ nationalist opponents to focus on
political manœuvering rather, the report implies, than on advancing a
substantive reform programme to address social and economic discontent.
Even if Papandreou’s manœuvering succeeded in engineering a majority, what
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it “could offer the country is clouded in obscurity, and, in terms of American
objectives, such a government would seem less attractive than the present one”.
The report’s advocacy of a “cautious and selective” approach, however, also
reflects the hawkish Cold War institutional environment in which its authors
were operating. In fact, with hard-line Cold Warrior Ellis Briggs as ambassador,
the Embassy largely dismissed Greece’s hapless liberals as politically irrelevant
and ignored them in favour of maintaining warm relations with the ruling
conservatives. But for the Embassy’s political section, at least, alarm in
Washington over the resurgence of the Communist Left provided the
opportunity to revive interest in a policy concept that had fallen out of favour
with the intensification of the Cold War: support for the Non-Communist Left. 
The rationale for the policy concept of supporting the Non-Communist
Left was co-optation of the Communist Left’s voting base. For its advocates,
American support for the Non-Communist Left was intended to foster the
emergence of an effective, democratic alternative political party that would
attract those who had turned to the Communist Left to express their economic
and social discontent. In Greece, the possibilities for the emergence of such a
party lay with anti-Communist liberals like George Papandreou, even if efforts
among such leaders to date had been deficient. Interestingly, the report cites
with favour the view “of some Greek leaders” that “one of the basic causes of
the present incertitudes goes back to the large numbers of Greek patriots who
were closely associated with the communists in EAM...and after siding with the
nationalists during the Bandit War, either have no place to go or have chosen
through design or apathy to move into the EDA columns”. If the resurgence of
the Communist Left reflected the political marginalisation of Non-
Communist, patriotically oriented Leftists and Liberals, then a potential
constituency existed for a party that would provide them with a home.
The concept of supporting the Non-Communist Left was not new among
US policymakers. It had its roots in the origins of US Cold War policies. Within
the bi-partisan coalition of Democratic and Republican internationalists that
had joined forces around the Truman Doctrine, support of the Non-
Communist Left represented the stress on what would later be called “soft
power” approaches favoured by liberals as opposed to the more military-
oriented “hard power” approaches favoured by conservatives.5 The soft power
orientation of liberals had found its main articulator in Harvard historian
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, beginning with his 1948 article in the New York Times,
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New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2002.
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which was the basis for his book The Vital Center.6 At the origins of the Cold
War, this approach found champions among influential figures within the
policy-making establishment, including the patrician statesman Averill
Harriman, as well as the CIA director Allen Dulles, but had largely gone
underground in the wake of the military emphasis that the 1950-1953 Korean
War gave to US Cold War policies. It, nonetheless, remained the basis for the
CIA’s soft power programmes to fund liberal organisations like the Congress for
Cultural Freedom and European labour unions, in addition to its hard power
organisation of covert military operations like the 1953 coup against
Mossadegeh in Iran or the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. In 1966
leading members of the American liberal establishment, in whose ranks
Andreas Papandreou was a rising member during the 1950s, would find
themselves seriously embarrassed by revelations of covert CIA funding.7
Embracing the key recommendation of the Embassy’s September 1958
report, the National Security Council’s Operations Coordinating Board (OCB)
revised its Operations Plan for Greece to provide a foothold for those
promoting Schlesinger’s concept of support for the Non-Communist Left – an
approach that Schlesinger would aggressively promote when he was special
assistant to President John Kennedy from 1961 to 1963. The revision was a
matter of no small moment within the policymaking bureaucracy; the OCB was
an interagency policymaking body in whose meetings the US president himself
participated and included high-ranking officials from the State Department,
the CIA and the Pentagon. The Operations Plans it developed for various
countries within the sphere of the US post-war “global responsibilities” were
intended to supervise implementation of American policies throughout the
government. The Operations Plan for Greece thus represented the most
comprehensive, operative policy document within the Eisenhower-era National
Security bureaucracy.8
On January 8, 1959 the OCB working group on Greece presented to President
Eisenhower and the other high-ranking members of the OCB a December 19,
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6 “Not Left, Not Right, but a Vital Center”, New York Times (April 4, 1948). Schlesinger’s
book, The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom, was originally published in Boston in 1949. 
7 Cf. Frances Stonor Saunders’ authoritative study of the CIA’s role in the Congress for
Cultural Freedom, Who Paid the Piper, London: Granta Books, 1999.
8 In sending the new Operations Plan for Greece to the US Embassy in Athens, OCB
chairman Christian Herter noted that “the OCB Working Group found particularly
valuable...recent despatches from the Embassy on the Greek political scene, especially 226 of
September 22, 1958”. Letter to Berger from Herter, January 9, 1959, NARA, Record Group
273, National Security Files.
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1958 report with its conclusions regarding the “unsatisfactory trends” in Greek
politics after the 1958 elections.9 “Although the Greek government remains firmly
in the hands of pro-Western conservative leaders,” the working group observed in
its presentation of the report, “the Communist-front United Democratic Left
(EDA) won an impressive 25% of the popular vote in the May 1958 elections. The
present political trend is toward a polarization between the right and the extreme
left at the expense of the center and moderate left groups, which tend to splinter
as well as lose strength.” The group then explained: “We are making efforts to
identify the US as effectively as possible with the aspirations of the Greeks for
improved economic and social conditions and are considering the role which
the US might play in rebuilding the center and moderate left groups and in
developing a non-Communist alternative should the present Karamanlis
government fail.”10
The redacted portions of the report as later published create a documentary
gap, but possibly articulated recommendations for achieving the objective of
“rebuilding center and moderate left groups”. However that may be, a key
element to attaining that objective was enshrined in the new OCB “Operations
Plan for Greece” that was published on December 23, 1958, four days after the
report, and revised on June 24, 1959.11 Based on the December 19 report, the
new plan significantly expanded and revised the directives on “Relations to
Political Parties” found in its earlier plan. The earlier Operations Plan had
limited itself to the cautionary directive that US officials should “avoid over-
identification with any one political party or figure”. Now, some significant
new language was added. Bemoaning the “splintering of the moderate
opposition parties” and “the absence of effective leadership” that would offer
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9 The draft presentation, “OCB Report on Greece”, dated January 8, 1959, is available
electronically online through the Declassified Documents Reference System.
10 The report itself, “Operations Coordinating Board Report on Greece (NSC5718/1)”,
has been published, with redactions, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-60, Vol.
X: Greece, Document 251, Washington, DC, 1994, pp. 643-649. The verbal presentation,
quoted above, uses much of the language from the report itself, as published in the FRUS.
However, 8ó lines of the published report were redacted following the phrase “improved
economic and social conditions”. The oral presentation continues from this point (although
for less than 8ó lines) as follows: “[we] are considering the role which the US might play in
rebuilding the center and moderate left groups and in developing a non-Communist
alternative should the present Karamanlis government fail.” 
11 “Operations Plan for Greece”, Operations Coordinating Board, Washington, DC,
December 23, 1958, Revised June 24, 1959, NARA, Record Group 273, National Security
Files.
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hope for “an effective alternative” to the Karamanlis government, the new
directive continues: “Economic and social grievances in Greece are extensive
enough so that in the absence of a modest and sustained economic growth in
Greece benefiting all population groups there could be political pressures which
could conceivably cause a serious weakening of the Karamanlis Government.”
The new directive thus advanced the proposition that the resurgence of the
Greek Left reflected growing discontent that threatened the hold of Greek
conservatives. It then drew the appropriate conclusions: “Consideration
should, therefore, be given to ways in which the US might help insure an
effective non-Communist opposition in Greece, as well as to insure the
continued existence in being of a strong political alignment in the moderately
conservative area of Greek politics now controlled by the Karamanlis party.”
The new Operations Plan for Greece thus laid the conceptual basis within
the National Security bureaucracy for American efforts to foster the emergence
of “an effective non-Communist opposition”, without undermining the “strong
alignment” of “moderately conservative forces” then in power under
Karamanlis. Implicitly, of course, this meant support for Non-Communist
liberal forces that would advance a programme for “modest and sustained
economic growth in Greece benefiting all population groups”. 
Into this picture stepped Andreas Papandreou. In June 1959 Papandreou
returned to Greece on sabbatical from the University of California at Berkeley.
His return followed a highly successful career in American academia that began
in 1940 when, only a few months after emigrating from Greece, he entered
Harvard to pursue a Ph.D. in economics. The ostensible purpose of his 1959-
1960 sabbatical was to study obstacles to Greece’s economic development. But
it also gave Papandreou an opportunity to revive the long-distance relationship
he had maintained with a leading figure in Greek Centrist circles – his father,
George Papandreou. 
To avoid misunderstanding, Andreas Papandreou’s return to Greece in 1959
was by no means a direct result of the OCB’s search for new leadership to
consolidate Greece’s splintered and demoralised Centrist forces. Nonetheless,
Papandreou’s interest in studying obstacles to Greece’s economic development
was clearly in harmony with the OCB’s concern over “the absence of a modest
and sustained economic growth in Greece benefiting all population groups”.
Hence, the renewed and urgent interest of US policymakers in promoting
Greek economic development created a climate hospitable to Andreas
Papandreou’s professional interests as an economist and nascent ambitions as a
politician. To the degree that he drew the attention of US foreign policy élites
for his potential as a future Greek political leader, Andreas Papandreou was, for
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a number of reasons, a remote prospect. First and foremost was the fact that,
despite his eminent father, he had no independent political standing within
Greek politics at all. Equally important were his profound reservations, after
nearly two decades in the United States, about becoming involved in Greece’s
tangled, and, in many respects, unpromising political scene. The introduction
of Andreas Papandreou into the narrative at this juncture courts the danger of
exaggerating his, in fact, negligible political impact at the time.12 The
justification for paying close attention to Andreas Papandreou in this period is
analytical rather than historical. The aftermath of the 1958 elections created the
conditions that ultimately led to his meteoric political rise. Remarkably
enough, by 1965, Andreas Papandreou would become a pivotal figure in
political developments, much to the disdain, by then, of US officials. If Andreas
Papandreou played at best a tangential role in the immediate aftermath of the
1958 elections, their impact on Greek politics and American policies was
essential to his capturing the potentials of the liberal awakening that those
elections made manifest. As Andreas Papandreou would later write, “When I
arrived in Greece [in 1959], the main, all-consuming issue was the surprising
comeback of the Left in the elections of 1958.”13 That much said, when he first
re-engaged in Greek affairs in 1959, the chances that he might play a significant
political role were still slim.
Of far greater and immediate interest to American officials in 1959 was
Andreas’ father, George Papandreou. In the context of the Embassy’s new and
officially sanctioned policy of establishing relations with select figures of the
Non-Communist Left, George Papandreou loomed large. Having been selected
by the British to preside as prime minister over Greece’s liberation in 1944, he
had firmly established credentials as a pro-Western, anti-Communist, but
liberally inclined Centrist.14 Embassy political officer Monteagle Stearns, one
of the drafters of the Embassy’s September 1958 report, proceeded to cultivate
contacts with the veteran liberal leader, as well as with other political figures
with the potential for forging a Non-Communist, socially more progressive
alternative to the ruling Right. In this, Stearns was acting in conformity with
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12 Thanks are due to Professor Yiannis Stefanidis of the University of Thessaloniki for
alerting me to this danger.
13 Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1970, p.
102.
14 In an article in the July 1951 issue of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou sought to
strengthen those credentials with the US foreign policy establishment as an anti-Communist
liberal. “The Bonds of Freedom”, Foreign Affairs 29/4 (1951), pp. 513 ff. 
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the new policy focus he had contributed to. Beginning in 1959, and lasting into
1960, a heterogeneous array of Non-Communist opponents of Karamanlis
made a series of abortive efforts to form an effective Centrist opposition party.15
The failure of their efforts apparently led Stearns to pick a favourite. On August
23, 1960, Stearns, on the basis of discussions with George Papandreou,
evaluated for the State Department Papandreou’s “prospects for returning to
power”. His evaluation concluded with a strong endorsement: 
From the standpoint of the United States, and our interest in seeing the
development of a responsible, pro-Western opposition in Greece,
Papandreou deserves discreet encouragement as a counter-weight to
politicians…who seek to strengthen their political position by
weakening their ties with the West. However slim are Papandreou’s
prospects of again heading a Government, the opportunities for wise
leadership of the opposition have never been greater.16
As Stearns met with George Papandreou in August 1960, Andreas
Papandreou was preparing to depart for the United States following the end of
his Greek sabbatical. Arriving in Berkeley in the Autumn of 1960, the younger
Papandreou carried in his pocket an invitation from Prime Minister Konstantine
Karamanlis to return to Athens to set up an economic research institute. The
purpose of the institute would be to introduce Western methods and expertise
into Greece for the sake of advancing the country’s economic development
efforts. Karamanlis’ invitation was the result of a number of converging interests.
After the discontent expressed by the electorate in the 1958 elections, Karamanlis
was under intensified pressure from US officials to improve his government’s
economic performance. That need was given added urgency by Karamanlis’
desire to associate Greece with the newly formed Common Market, a free trade
association based on the alliance of French agriculture and West German
industry. George Papandreou, who longed for his son’s return, was aware of
Karamanlis’ needs and used them as an opportunity to prompt Karamanlis’
invitation. Using Xenophon Zolotas, Governor of the Bank of Greece, as his
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15 Omitted from this narrative are the attempts, on the one hand, by Sophocles Venizelos
and guerrilla hero George Grivas, and on the other, by a clatch of mainly liberal figures,
including George Papandreou, Konstantine Mitsotakis, Panagiotis Papaligouras and George
Rallis, to form a Centrist opposition. While the complete story of the emergence of the
Center Union would need to include this important period of political turmoil, the main
importance of these efforts, as far as US policymakers were concerned, is that they led
nowhere. 
16 “The Prospects of George Papandreou”, August 23, 1960. Foreign Service dispatch
no. 180, NARA, Record Group 59, Country Files, Greece, Pol.
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intermediary, George Papandreou raised the possibility of his son contributing to
the Karamanlis government’s economic development efforts.17
The final factor in generating Karamanlis’ invitation was Andreas
Papandreou himself. Having put in a stellar performance as chairman of the
University of California at Berkeley’s economics department, Papandreou was
attracted to the prospects of taking on new challenges. During his sabbatical
year in Athens, he had spent substantial time with an old Harvard colleague,
Carl Kaysen, who also was in Greece that year on a Ford Foundation grant to
study the impact of Marshall Plan funding of Greek electrification and
telecommunications infrastructure projects. Over the year, the two men had
come up with the proposal for the economic research institute, a proposal
which Andreas Papandreou left with Karamanlis before departing Greece.18
Arriving in the United States, Papandreou went in pursuit of funding from the
Ford and Rockefeller foundations to finance the project, drawing on Carl
Kaysen’s ties with these foundations for help.19
The Ford and Rockefeller foundations put Papandreou’s project proposal on
a fast track. By January 1961 funding for the institute had been approved to the
tune of $500,000 over a five-year period. Notably, the two foundations backing
him were bastions of the North-East internationalist corporate liberalism that,
at the time, played an important role in both the Democratic and Republican
parties. In their international programmes, they regarded themselves as
handmaidens of US foreign policies aimed at winning the Cold War through
the promotion of economic development, education and public health in
developing countries. Such programmes were exercises in public diplomacy,
exemplary uses of private American wealth to relieve the social and economic
discontents abroad that gave the Communist Left the basis for recruiting a
popular following. The executive leadership of these foundations also provided
a pool of talent from which the Kennedy Administration would draw heavily
to fill important positions within the foreign policy bureaucracy. Exemplifying
this personnel interchange between the government and these private
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to Andreas Papandreou, cf. in particular George Papandreou’s letter to his son of September
26, 1960, originally printed in ∂ÛÙ›· (July 11, 1987), reprinted in Potis Paraskevopoulos,
∞Ó‰Ú¤·˜ ¶··Ó‰Ú¤Ô˘. ¶ÔÏÈÙÈÎﬁ ÔÚÙÚ·›ÙÔ [Andreas Papandreou: political portrait], Athens
1998, pp. 14-15. Monteagle Stearns confirmed George Papandreou’s central role in an
interview with me on October 17, 2002.
18 Memorandum from Andreas Papandreou to Prime Minister Karamanlis, July 5, 1960.
Archives of the Bank of Greece.
19 Author interview with Carl Kaysen, Cambridge, MA, October 16, 2002.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 09:05:35 |
foundations was the fact that Papandreou’s proposal for an economic research
institute was the last to receive the approval of Rockefeller Foundation
president Dean Rusk before he assumed his new duties as John F. Kennedy’s
Secretary of State. 
As a rising member of the US liberal academic establishment, Andreas
Papandreou was by no means innocent of the political context of his proposal
to establish the Center of Economic Research in Athens. In a confidential
report written to clinch foundation financing, he couched his rationale for the
Center in terms of American fears that, lacking “economic growth in Greece
benefiting all population groups”, as the OCB Operations Plan had put it, the
right–left political polarisation in Greece would intensify. In a confidential
December 12, 1960 report, Papandreou made his final pitch for foundation
support in terms that played to the alarm in policymaking circles over the
advances shown by Greece’s Communist Left in the 1958 elections. Arguing
that “the time for basic changes in Greece has arrived”, he continued:
Indeed, unless these changes are undertaken by people and forces
sympathetic to the West, they will be surely undertaken by the pro-
Soviet forces whose numerical strength is being enhanced by the failures
of the present leadership. Greece’s recent economic record is not
impressive, particularly when compared with that of her neighbors
(Yugoslavia, Bulgaria). And there is growing discontent and mounting
pressure for economic and social change.20
In these words, Papandreou was anticipating the theme that, immediately
following Kennedy’s November election, served as a guiding concept in the new
Administration’s emphasis on soft power. This emphasis is exemplified in the
core proposition of a Kennedy policy paper written a few months later,
whereby:
[T]he main thrust of U.S. aid in the next decade should be directed
toward repelling the more likely Soviet threat of indirect aggression by
furthering economic development and national building. It is
increasingly apparent that neither the capability nor the will to resist
communist aggression and subversion can exist in the absence of
satisfactory rates of economic and social development.21
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Closing his appeal for the funding of his economic institute, Papandreou avers
that “In many ways, it is the best kind of offer the West can make to Greece
during these critical years.”
Only a few days before Kennedy’s inauguration as President in January
1961, Andreas Papandreou arrived in Athens to set up the Center of Economic
Research (KOE) in Athens. Kennedy’s ascent to power was serendipitous for the
younger Papandreou. The Kennedy Presidency raised to unprecedented
positions of power and influence the same forces of North-East American
liberalism that had backed the founding of KOE in Greece. And when, a few
years later, Papandreou entered Greek politics, his ties with key figures from the
Kennedy Administration imbued him with the aura of progressive American
know-how that worked strongly to his benefit with the Greek public. Andreas
Papandreou’s élite connections with both Greek liberals (through his father)
and American liberals (through his Harvard pedigree, Democratic Party
involvements while at the University of Minnesota, and his UC Berkeley
chairmanship) uniquely positioned him to serve as the bridge between the
rising expectations in Greece and the tentative opening to Non-Communist
Centrist and Leftist forces abroad that marked the more generous intentions of
Kennedy’s New Frontier.22
In the meantime, Andreas Papandreou’s father was at the center of Greek
political developments. Stearns’ endorsement of the elder Papandreou proved
justified a year later when the latter finally managed, a few months before the
October 1961 Greek elections, to achieve what American policymakers had
long been hoping for. He brought together the country’s diverse Non-
Communist opponents of Karamanlis into a union of the Center by creating
the Center Union Party. George Papandreou thus brought to fruition the trend
which the Embassy had identified in its September 1958 report of “strivings for
the establishment of a ‘new’ center party, or center coalition which would
provide a nationalist haven for those opposed both to ERE and EDA”.
The degree to which any “discreet encouragement” by the United States
helped George Papandreou to become the leader of united Centrist forces is
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unclear. Jean Meynaud, in his classic work on Political Forces in Greece,
suggests that a senior State Department official, George McGhee, was
dispatched to Athens in June and July 1961 to facilitate negotiations amongst
Centrist forces.23 But Kennedy’s election itself helped foster in Greece a
political climate within the Greek electorate conducive to the Center’s rising
political fortunes. John F. Kennedy’s assumption of the Presidency in January
1961, after winning the November 1960 elections, turned out to be a watershed
event in US post-war political and social history. In his famous inaugural
speech, Kennedy cast himself in the role of spokesman for a generational
changing of the guard – a shift from those who had led the country during
economic depression and war to those whose youths had been stamped by these
experiences. Kennedy liberals were anxious to dispel any suggestion that their
progressive social agenda made them “soft on Communism”. They took pride
in being “tough-minded” realists, reflected in Kennedy’s campaign emphasis on
armament because of a putative “missile gap” with the Soviet Union. Still, after
eight long years of austere conservative rule with war hero Dwight Eisenhower
at the helm, the liberal hour had finally arrived. In Greece and other countries,
as well as in the United States, the young leader of the Free World was an iconic
figure in whom people invested their hopes for change and renewal. 
But Kennedy’s election also served George Papandreou’s political interests in
more practical ways. Among the Harvard-based liberal intellectuals that
Kennedy drew on as he took office was Carl Kaysen, who became a special
assistant to Kennedy’s powerful national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy. As
Andreas Papandreou arrived in Athens to advance an agenda for socially
progressive economic development, he also provided his father with powerful
connections to assertive liberal elements within the Kennedy Administration,
most directly Kaysen. Like McGeorge Bundy and Papandreou mentor, Harvard
economist John Kenneth Galbraith, Kaysen was among those liberal voices in
the Kennedy Administration who were strongly at odds with the institutionally
conservative bias of the State Department bureaucracy. At the National
Security Council, Kaysen allied himself with Administration officials
promoting US support for the Non-Communist Left in Europe, Asia and Latin
America. A key figure in mobilising within the Administration to turn US
policies in this direction was the man who had been the original articulator of
the concept, Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, Kennedy’s special
assistant. During the course of 1961, Schlesinger scored a success in Italy by
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working around the State Department bureaucracy to achieve Kennedy
support for an “opening to the Left” (apertura a sinistra), an important policy
shift in which the US dropped its post-war opposition to the participation of
Italians socialists in government coalitions.24 Greece was also in the sights of
these liberal proponents of “democracy as a fighting faith”, in the felicitous
language of Schlesinger’s 1948 article on the Vital Center.
Indicative of Kaysen’s stance in support of a Greek opening to the Left was a
memo he wrote for Kennedy on the occasion of Karamanlis’ April 1961 official
visit to Washington, the first Greek prime minister to be so recognised since
World War II. The official State Department briefings for Kennedy touted
Karamanlis as a critical American ally and asserted categorically that “We see no
acceptable alternative to Mr. Karamanlis on the Greek political scene.”25 Sharing
Schlesinger’s liberal perspective, Carl Kaysen offered a sharp counter-point to the
State Department’s unqualified endorsement of the conservative Karamanlis. 
In advance of the Greek leader’s visit, he wrote a memo for Kennedy in
which he cast doubts on Karamanlis’ reputation as a guarantor of political
stability in Greece. While acknowledging that “his regime has been one of
prosperity”, that prosperity had been “very unequally distributed” while
“nothing has been done to attack the fundamental problems of urban
unemployment and rural under-employment”. Kaysen then turns to the
“political consequences” of Karamanlis’ reign. Noting the burgeoning voting
support for the “frankly fellow-traveling” EDA, he continues:
The “democratic” opposition is pulverized and feeble, so that voting for
EDA seems the only effective way to express opposition to the present
government, and many do so who are in no sense communists or pro-
Soviet. The weakness of the Center is the product of many factors,
including the irresponsibility of many of its leaders, but we have made
a significant contribution to it by our warm support of Karamanlis. 
Kaysen then urged Kennedy to adopt a more neutral stance towards
Karamanlis in view of the impact his US visit could have on Greek elections
expected in the Autumn of 1961. “From the viewpoint of the long-term
interests of both [the] US and Greece, we should do what we can to minimize
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the appearance of Presidential support for Karamanlis, the politician.” He went
on to propose that this perhaps “could best be accomplished by bringing a
suitable collection of Center opposition leaders to the US on a State
Department-sponsored visit in the month or six weeks after Karamanlis’ visit,
and arranging a meeting with the President for them”.26
While not adopted, Kaysen’s proposal reflects the attempt to steer US
policies towards a policy more supportive of Greek liberals. At the same time,
the Karamanlis government itself betrayed its sensitivity to growing American
interest in the creation of an effective Non-Communist opposition as a means
of undercutting the influence of the Communist Left. As a prelude to
Karamanlis’ April 1961 visit, the Greek political world was occupied with
intense discussions on the all-important issue of the electoral law under which
the Autumn elections would be conducted. Reflecting the continuing
importance that Greek political élites placed on the approval of its trans-Atlantic
patron, the US Embassy was an active party to these discussions. On February
28, 1961 Greek foreign minister Evangelos Averoff met with Ambassador Ellis
Briggs and Deputy Chief of Mission Sam Berger.27 While the Embassy ended
up rejecting Averoff ’s proposed electoral law, Berger nonetheless praised
Averoff ’s interest in resolving “a problem which has plagued Greece ever since
the end of the war, i.e. how to obtain stable one-party majorities, offer the
country a choice between two nationalist parties, and reduce the communists to
a minor role”. Critical to the Karamanlis government’s interest in the emergence
of the Center as an effective opposition force, however, was that the Center
remain an effective opposition, not the government.
In the meantime, George Papandreou’s unification of the country’s diverse
Non-Communist, anti-Karamanlis political factions into the Center Union
Party was not the only trend noted in the Embassy’s 1958 report to bear fruit.
Also evident in the run-up to the 1961 elections were “measures to curb the
growing power of the neo-communists, perhaps to the point of straining the
fabric of democratic legality”, as the 1958 report had put it, adding presciently
that “calls for extra-legal action against the communists…once under way
could well be strained to embrace ‘leftists’ of all types”.28 These fears were
realised during the 1961 parliamentary election campaign when the right-wing
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Royalist service government appointed to conduct the elections oversaw the use
of the state machinery, security forces and army in a coordinated programme
to use “extra-legal action against the communists”. These extra-legal actions
were, in fact, directed against “‘leftists’ of all types”, including the liberal forces
represented by the Center Union. As later documented more fully when
“Operation Pericles” was made public, widespread “fraud and violence” was
used in the 1961 elections, not only to reduce the voting strength of the
Communist Left, but also of the Center Union.29 Notably, the spillover of
extra-legal means to suppress Centrist forces was itself encouraged by the threat
posed by George Papandreou’s success in uniting Centrist forces into the
Center Union. The Right was determined that the Center fulfill its designated
role as the nationalist, anti-Communist opposition. 
The threat from the Center was not the only problem facing Karamanlis in
the run-up to the 1961 elections. He was also threatened by another Kennedy
Administration foreign policy shift. In light of the success of American aid in
rebuilding Greece’s devastated economic infrastructure and military
capabilities, the United States’ nation-building role in Greece was nearing
completion. Reflecting a broader global revision of US Cold War policies,
policymakers felt it was time for the United States to disengage itself from
playing a direct protectorate role in Cold War dependencies like Greece.30
This US interest in disengaging itself from direct involvement in Greece’s
internal affairs was not principally the product of the New Frontier’s idealistic
commitment to the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention
that are supposed to govern international relations in a world of nation-states.
Instead, it was driven by a pragmatic desire to disburden the United States of
the onerous costs and complications of managing the global “responsibilities”
which the country had inherited following the collapse of the old European
empires in the wake of World War II. In Greece, which New Frontier economic
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theorists, like Walt Rostow, felt was nearing “take-off ” into “self-sustaining
economic growth”, US economic aid could safely be reduced, they reasoned,
without creating the social discontents that might feed the resurgent
Communist Left. 
As it turned out, the Greek dependency on the US that the triumphant
Truman Doctrine had fostered was entangling in ways that advocates of these
new policies had not anticipated. With the October 1961 elections approaching,
the word in Greek diplomatic circles was that the Kennedy Administration
would soon announce discontinuation of economic aid to offset the burdens of
Greece’s defense budget.31 The news shook the Karamanlis government, which
expressed its dismay to the new Deputy Chief of Mission William Tapley
Bennett. Siding with Karamanlis, Bennett stressed to the State Department that
“this [is the] worst possible timing in view of imminent elections, would have
incalculable effect on voting, would be played with maximum emphasis to
Greek people by Communists as confirmation of their worst charges against the
US et cetera”.32 Bennett noted that, “This comes at a time which will ensure
maximum unfavourable publicity and harmful effects for us locally.” He
concluded with an argument Kennedy reformers were to hear in a number of
variants from US missions around the world: “I realize demands on the US are
pressing everywhere”, Bennett wrote, “but do we want to rock the Greek boat
before it is tight enough to weather rough seas on its own?” 
Fortunately for Karamanlis, the announcement of cuts was postponed until
after the elections, but the issue suggested to Greek political and military élites
that Karamanlis no longer enjoyed the unqualified support of the United
States. In the meantime, the Greek officials argued to their American
counterparts that US plans to cut aid involved a contradiction. For Greece to
devote more of its own resources to defense spending (in order to maintain its
NATO commitments) would mean denying funds to its economic development
efforts. Greece was being pressured to accomplish the impossible task of
delivering on both fronts at the same time.33 Beginning in 1962, the United
States responded by seeking “greater participation by NATO countries in the
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financing of the additional defense and economic burden which the Greek
economy cannot yet support”.34
While the military and economic aid debate strained Greek–American
relations, the domestic fallout from election irregularities perturbed Greece’s
domestic scene. While it is unclear whether “Operation Pericles” gave
Karamanlis his 1961 election victory, it unquestionably reinforced it, yielding,
for instance, a 79% vote for ERE among voters in the military and the public
sector (who voted separately from the general public). Moreover, ERE increased
its overall popular vote to 51% from the 41% it had earned in 1958. The newly
formed Center Union received 34%, while the Communist Left’s voting
support dropped from 24 to 15%.35 Outrage over the tactics of the Right
amongst voters of the Center (as well as the Left) led George Papandreou to
declare that the Center Union would not recognise the legitimacy of the newly
elected Karamanlis government. He launched, instead, an “unyielding fight”
[∞Ó¤Ó‰ÔÙÔ˜ ∞ÁÒÓ·˜], calling for new elections. With this, the liberal
awakening in Greece began to take on serious proportions. While the prospects
of the Center Union’s “unyielding fight” were initially uncertain, it had, by the
Spring of 1962, picked up significant public support, exemplified in a mass rally
in April 1962 that was attacked by police, sharpening the divisions between the
Right and the Center. 
From his position as director of the Center for Economic Research, Andreas
Papandreou remained a vicarious participant in his father’s protest campaign.
In relation to US officials, however, his participation was real rather than
virtual. Shortly after the elections, he visited Washington to register his protest
over the US Embassy’s endorsement of the Greek electoral process and the
legitimacy of its outcome. Included in his criticism was Laughlin Campbell, the
CIA station chief in Athens, whom Andreas had come into conflict with during
Embassy efforts, in the Spring of 1961, to enlist George Papandreou’s support
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for an electoral law designed to isolate EDA in the upcoming elections.36
Predictably, Andreas Papandreou’s meetings were arranged by Carl Kaysen. 
In January 1962 Ellis Briggs ended his tenure as Ambassador to Greece. His
ambassadorship had largely held in check those in the foreign policy apparatus
seeking to distance the US from unqualified support of Karamanlis. He was
replaced, however, by the more liberal Kennedy appointee Henri Labouisse.
During this transition at the US Embassy, George Papandreou’s “unyielding
fight” began to attract a substantial public following. It was becoming the focal
point for the liberal awakening whose nascent beginnings lay in the 1958 protest
vote for EDA. Andreas Papandreou, however, had already impulsively decided to
leave Greece, planning to return to Berkeley in the Autumn of 1962. As he
watched the public gather under the banner of his father’s “unyielding fight”, he
began to feel growing excitement, as well as regret over his plans to leave that
Autumn. In a May 19, 1962 letter to Shepard Stone, his key backer at the Ford
Foundation, he described how his father’s “unyielding fight” was beginning to
take flight.37 The letter also manifests Andreas Papandreou’s belief that, with the
new Ambassador in place, the interest of US policymakers in supporting the
Non-Communist alternatives to the Right was also beginning to take hold
seriously: “The Embassy itself feels that Greece is in a state of transition and it
is eager to see social reforms take place before the situation tightens into a Right
vs. Left struggle. It recognizes now that the Center opposition (my Father’s
party) in taking up the cudgel against election malpractices and corruption in
government has acted as a barrier to the expected development.”
But George Papandreou’s “unyielding fight” was matched by Karamanlis’
unyielding determination not to accede to the Center Union’s demands. In
Brigg’s farewell visit to Karamanlis a few months before, the prime minister
expressed anger at the “continuing paralytic effects of opposition behavior” and
“once more” recalled “his efforts to promote the formation of non-Communist
opposition...[W]here else in the world but Greece could such opposition,
having doubled its Parliamentary representation, spend three solid months after
the elections kicking and screaming and shouting about the iniquity of it all.”38
George Papandreou’s “unyielding fight” did not lead directly to Karamanlis’
fall from power, but it helped create the conditions that led to it. Faced with
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the increasing public unrest manifest in the “unyielding fight” and attracted to
Gaullist models of parliamentary government, Karamanlis began to advocate
constitutional changes that would invest greater executive power in the prime
minister. The move aroused the ire of the Greek monarchy, another critical
player in the tri-polar structure of power that had emerged in the aftermath of
the Civil War. The three poles were the popularly elected government, the anti-
Communist army and the monarchy. With the army under the protection of
the king and the parliamentary government under the control of the Right, this
tri-polar structure had remained largely in alignment as the guarantor for
Greece’s anti-Communist orientation towards the West. But each pole was also
protective of its own turf. Karamanlis’ bid for greater executive power drew the
hostility of the monarchy. In 1955 Karamanlis, in fact, had been the beneficiary
of royal interventionism when he had been selected by King Paul over the heads
of the leaders of the Greek Rally, Stephanos Stephanopoulos and Panayiotis
Kanellopoulos, to form a new government following the death of Prime
Minister Papagos. Now ired, however, by Karamanlis’ efforts to restrict the
palace’s political activism, the palace began to seek ways to cut him down to
size, culminating in a dispute over the royal family’s plans to visit the United
Kingdom. The dispute provided the excuse for forcing Karamanlis’ resignation
on June 11, 1963, an objective Queen Frederika, in particular, had for some
time been pursuing. 
Already by early April 1963, however, Greek army leaders had become aware
that trouble was brewing between Karamanlis and the monarchy. Fearing that
a split in the forces of the Right would open the way to George Papandreou’s
Center Union coming to power, alarmed right-wing officers approached the US
Embassy through the US army attaché to appeal for American backing of a
coup d’état. The negative response the Greek officers received from US officials
further clarified the US position regarding support for a Centrist alternative to
the Right. 
That clarification came from Assistant Secretary of State Philips Talbot’s
response to Ambassador Labouisse, who had rebuffed the approach of the
Greek officers, but had also written to Talbot seeking further guidance.
Providing Labouisse with arguments for explaining the negative US response,
Talbot’s reply indicates that the Center Union had gained credibility in
American policymaking circles as a viable alternative to the Right:
Obviously it is impossible for Caramanlis to remain in power
indefinitely and we are prepared to cooperate with another government,
should it come to power through constitutional means. We would not
be diffident concerning the possibility of working with such a
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government as long as the turnover did not involve Communists or find
them represented in the cabinet [my italics]. 
While qualifying US acceptance of a Centrist alternative with the proviso
that it remained anti-Communist in orientation, Talbot also indicates a wide
margin of tolerance for the Center Union’s dissident tactics: 
We are aware of the dilemma caused by the Center Union’s “inexorable”
struggle [viz. unyielding fight] and realize that perhaps this causes
anxiety and frustration among various circles in Greece...[Nonetheless],
we are not unduly concerned about the Center campaign [my italics],
although we would obviously prefer the Center to focus its energy on
Greece’s real problem areas, rather than its present activities, including
accusing the United States of meddling in Greek affairs.39
Talbot’s willingness to accept the Greek Center was paralleled by discreet
American support for a key demand from George Papandreou. In the run-up
to the 1963 elections, Papandreou threatened to abstain from the contest unless
the king replaced ERE figure Panagiotis Pipinelis, appointed prime minister
after Karamanlis’ resignation. His argument was that the presence of a prime
minister under Karamanlis’ control sharply tilted the political playing field
against the Center Union. Urged privately by the US Embassy to accept
Papandreou’s demand, King Paul replaced Karamanlis loyalist Pipinelis on
September 27 with a neutral service government headed by a respected jurist.40
A more general perspective on changes in US policy is provided by an
experienced Greek diplomat, Rodis Roufos, who noted that “President
Kennedy...gave a more liberal character to American policy”, shifting the US
away from the hard-line conservatism of the Eisenhower years.41 Implying that
the US used the palace as an agent of influence in Greece, Roufos continued:
“One assumes that it was no mere coincidence that from 1961 onwards there
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was a distinct cooling off in the Greek court’s attitude towards Karamanlis, and
a willingness to flirt with the Centre Union...” 
Support for the Non-Communist Left also had a positive synergy with the
Kennedy Administration’s pragmatic interest in fostering Greece’s transition to
non-dependency. For without the solidification of a parliamentary system that,
as Berger put it, produced “stable one-party majorities” offering “a choice
between two nationalist parties” and “reduce[d] the communists to a minor
role”,42 Greece’s status as the great American Cold War success story remained
in doubt. 
Karamanlis’ resignation in June 1963 led to the setting of new elections for
November 3. Operating under more favourable conditions after the king’s
September dismissal of Pipinelis, the Center Union surprised political
professionals by surpassing ERE to win a plurality of the popular vote, although
only a minority of seats in parliament. Given the mandate to form a
government by the king, Papandreou manœuvered deftly to garner support
from the palace. He assured the king that he would not interfere with the
monarchy’s control over the leadership of the army. He declined EDA’s offer to
support the Center Union in a vote of confidence, thereby giving it a
parliamentary majority. This refusal assured the Americans, for whom isolation
of the Communists was a condition for US support. It also helped convince the
king to accede to his request for new elections. For his part, Karamanlis,
unwilling to accept the role of opposition leader, went into self-exile in Paris.
New elections were held on February 16, 1964. Having initiated a number of
popular reforms and shattered ERE’s image of invincibility, the Center Union
won a stunning 53% of the vote and a comfortable majority in parliament.
Within the US foreign policymaking circles, the Center Union victory was a
validation of those who advocated a policy of cultivating the development of a
Non-Communist alternative to the Right. More broadly, American liberals
celebrated the Center Union victory as a vindication of their support for the
Truman Doctrine. It was evidence that America’s 15-year nation-building
mission had finally succeeded in fostering the emergence of a viable, two-party
democracy. In reality, matters were not so simple. The military remained an
obstacle to the consolidation of the country’s parliamentary democracy. Among
other things, the military’s anti-Communist leadership was deeply suspicious
that, in order to secure its grip on power, the Centrists would be drawn into a
“popular front” with the Communist Left. Still, against the threat of military
intervention, George Papandreou was defended, not only by his agreement with
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the king to leave royal control of the military untouched, but also by the backing
of the US Embassy, which stood by the Talbot directives of the previous Spring
in opposing putschist appeals from the military and affirming its willingness to
work with a Centrist government. Just before the February elections, the
Embassy even alerted George Papandreou to a military coup in the making. The
vehicle for this alert was his son, Andreas Papandreou, who in June of 1963 had
returned to Greece with the intention of entering the political arena.43
Liberal prospects in Greece were again strengthened by the new global
atmospherics created by the Kennedy Administration. Andreas Papandreou’s
return to Greece in June 1963 coincided with Kennedy’s launch of the policy of
détente, inaugurating a welcome thaw in the Cold War. The previous October,
the world had held its breath as the United States and the Soviet Union edged
to the brink of nuclear confrontation over Soviet moves to install nuclear
missiles in Cuba. The crisis passed when, swallowing his pride, Khrushchev
relented, agreeing to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba in exchange for secret
assurances given by Kennedy to dismantle US missiles based in Turkey, on the
Soviet Union’s southern border. 
Traumatised by their close encounter with nuclear disaster, the superpowers
discovered a mutual interest in establishing rules to regulate their global
competition. In a vivid symbolic gesture, they established a hotline between the
White House and the Kremlin. On June 10, President Kennedy gave a major
foreign policy speech at American University that heralded an era of peaceful
coexistence with the Soviet Union. Kennedy’s dramatic pronouncements
cleared the way for a landmark nuclear test ban treaty among the US, the USSR
and the UK. 
The immediate impact of these developments in frontline states like Greece
was to diminish politically paralysing Cold War fears and strengthen the
public’s willingness to entertain the risks of political change. The beginnings of
détente fostered a climate of new possibilities and a disposition towards change
that strengthened the Center Union’s appeal to Greek voters at the same
moment that the US, as reflected in the Talbot directives, manifested its
embrace of the Center Union as a viable alternative to Karamanlis. 
For his part, Andreas Papandreou also received encouragement for his hopes
of American support for progressive reform in Greece during his 1962-1963
return to Berkeley. He became affiliated with an élite International Study Group
on Democratic Development that had been organised by Arthur Schlesinger
with the ambition of eventually creating a Democratic International of parties
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identified with the Non-Communist Left. To support his initiative, Schlesinger
had created an informal network of highly placed liberals within the Kennedy
Administration.44 One of the objectives of this liberal network was to promote
new leadership that would challenge autocratic conservative forces in countries
around the world. In an instance of perverse serendipity, the elections in Greece
took place in the same month as Kennedy’s assassination. With Lyndon
Johnson’s assumption of the presidency, Schlesinger’s days in Washington were
numbered. Just as the Non-Communist Left, or at least the nearest thing to it
in Greece, took power in Greece, its support network within the American
executive branch began to dissolve. The power of North-East liberal élites
receded as the roughneck Texan president became increasingly focused on the
deepening American involvement in Vietnam. 
In Greece, however, the horses, so to speak, had already left the stable.
Popular expectations for change that had been raised at the beginning of the
brief Kennedy era continued to exert pressure on established structures of
power and privilege. Divisions within the ruling conservative establishment
surfaced when, on June 11, 1963, Prime Minister Karamanlis resigned in a
dispute with the monarchy. In new elections scheduled for November 3, 1963
the Center Union gained the most votes, but lacking a parliamentary majority,
received the king’s backing for new elections. Executing his decision to enter
the political arena, Andreas Papandreou ran for parliament in February 1964,
won a seat in Achaia and was subsequently appointed by his father as Minister
to the Prime Minister. Having assumed the self-chosen role as a change agent,
Andreas Papandreou increasingly became the focus of clashes between the
government, on the one hand, and the monarchy and right-wing military élite,
on the other. At the US Embassy, embrace of the Center Union’s reform
orientation gave way to alarm that it was permitting change to get out of hand.
The argument that the Center Union deserved US support as a means of
reducing the influence of the Communist Left found few advocates. The
prevailing argument was that the Center Union’s permissive policies were
giving free rein to latent anti-American feelings, particularly over Cyprus, and
a drift to the Left, opening the door to Greek neutralism or worse. In addition,
Andreas was held responsible by American officials for the Center Union
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government’s failure to accept an American-backed plan for resolving the
Cyprus issue – a resolution that would have required Athens to carry off a
military coup to topple Cypriot president Archbishop Makarios.
The complex story of the US role in the subsequent period of political
instability that led to the April 1967 coup is beyond the scope of this paper.
Suffice it to note that, unable to find a way to reconcile itself with the forces of
change that the Kennedy administration had, in multiple ways, encouraged,
the US ended up backing the increasingly beleauguered forces of the Right,
leaving the US with no meaningful political options, which is to say no way to
effectively leverage Greece’s domestic political dynamics to advance American
interests. On July 15, 1965, the king manœuvered George Papandreou into
resigning as prime minister, resulting in massive public protests and calls for
new elections. Fearing that new elections would result in a repudiation of the
monarchy, the king refused to grant them, and instead engineered a new
government out of the existing parliament through the opposition ERE party’s
support of a breakaway group of Center Union deputies. Weakly disguised
threats to use the army to impose a royal dictatorship further exacerbated the
political crisis, which came to a head in the Spring of 1967. The king finally
agreed to elections, but continued to make plans for a coup. On April 14, 1967,
Philips Talbot, now the US Ambassador, reported that:
[...] instability endemic since July 1965 has deteriorated into [the]
imminent danger of a first-class mess leading [Greece] to [a] brutal
choice between dictatorship and Andreas Papandreou-led attacks on
[the] monarch and probably Greece’s foreign alignment [...]
With [the] King and one party (ERE) now aligned against [the] rest of
the political field, traditional instruments of power – [the] Palace,
armed forces, conservative political and economic interests – find
themselves ranged against all centrist as well as leftist elements,
undoubtedly representing [the] majority of the population, who in
turn act increasingly frustrated, angry, anti-monarchical and probably
anti-Alliance.45
The crisis left the Embassy and State Department in the position of tacitly
accepting Greece’s dictatorship option; for to oppose a dictatorship would be to
support forces that were allegedly hostile to US interests, an assessment that
trumped American recognition that these same forces were supported by the
majority of Greek voters. Faced with a popular rejection of the country’s
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traditional instruments of power and a questioning of its NATO orientation, the
US soon found itself in the uneasy, but irresistible embrace of a dictatorship – an
embrace that would wreak permanent damage on its relationship with Greece.
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“The Greek Political Scene”, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
to the American Embassy in Athens, November 24, 1958 (Confidential).
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